

# COSC 366

## Intro to Cybersecurity

Dr. Suya  
Fall 2024

# Daily Updates

- Late policy:
  - 5 free days, after that, 10% of the grade will be deducted for each late day.
  - If you submit early: get additional free days; once accumulated free days exceed a threshold, you get bonus points
- Plan to use PointSolution to track attendance
  - <https://echo360.com/get-started-with-point-solutions/>
  - No penalty if you miss the class
  - Get 1 point if you answer questions, and 2 points if you answer correctly
  - The questions disappear after 2 minutes
  - Check the instruction in the announcement later

## echopoll & pointsolutions


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**echo360**  
Learning Inspired



# Daily Updates

- TA office hours:
  - Mon 11:30-12:30, Wed 12:30-1:30, Fri 1:30-2:30
  - Location: MK 235
- Instructor office hour
  - Tue 10:30-11:30
  - Location: MK 344

# Request from a colleague

- Prof. Fei Liu
  - Research in robotics, seeking undergraduate researchers
  - Teaching reinforcement learning (ECE 414/517) this semester, can audit the class if interested
  - Webpage: <https://Innx2006.github.io>
  - Email: [fliu33@utk.edu](mailto:fliu33@utk.edu)

# Today's Class

- Security concepts 101
- Think like an adversary

# What Is Cybersecurity?

- Systems without security
- Systems with security
- The key difference:
  - Security involves an adversary who is **malicious, active** and **dynamic**
  - Attackers constantly seek to circumvent protective measures

# What Is Cybersecurity?

- Attackers are not normal users
- Normal users: try to avoid bugs/flaws
- Attackers: try to find the bugs/flaws out and to exploit them



# What Does It Mean to be Secure?

- There is no such thing as security, only degrees of insecurity
- Goal: raise the bar for the attacker
  - Too difficult
  - Too expensive
- Ultimately, we want to mitigate **undesired behavior** while maintaining **main functionality**

# What Are **Undesired** Behaviors?

- Reveals information users want to hide:  
**Confidentiality**

# Confidentiality


- Only authorized parties should learn certain information
- Examples:
  - The contents of a file on a disk, a value in a database, etc.
  - Information traveling between two parties over a network
  - The fact that two parties are communicating (anonymity and privacy)

# Confidentiality Challenges

- Need to think carefully and clearly define
  - What data is protected
    - Just because *some* data is confidential in a system, it does not mean *all* data needs to be confidential
  - Who is authorized
- Need to think about ***side channels*** – flaws that are in the implementation, not the design

# Side channel attacks

- Power analysis
  - Power consumption of devices
  - Different operations or values may have different patterns



# Side channel attacks

- Any other side channels?

# Side channel attacks

- Acoustic
  - Sound emission of devices
  - Examples: key presses, hard-drive noises, printer noises
- Heat
  - Heat emissions from devices such as CPU, GPU
  - Certain operations require more processing (more heat)
- Cache access
  - Difference in cache accesses or timing differences

**Becomes more vulnerable with the advancement of ML models!**

# What Are **Undesired** Behaviors?

- Reveals information users want to hide:  
**Confidentiality**
- Modified information or functionality: **integrity**



# Integrity


- Everything is as it should be
- Examples:
  - Data integrity - Only an allowed party can write to a particular resource
  - Authentication integrity - An entity should be who they claim to be
  - Computational integrity - A function should correctly compute a result
  - Business logic integrity - A computation should result in the intended behavior under application specific requirements (e.g., amazon discounts)
  - Control flow integrity - A function should do the task it was written for

# What Are **Undesired** Behaviors?

- Reveals information users want to hide: **confidentiality**
- Modified information or functionality: **integrity**
- Denies access to a service: **availability**

# Availability

- “Authorized users” should be able to interact with resources when they wish to in the



Data: Cisco Annual Internet Report (2018-2023)

# More on the CIA Triad

- CIA Triad: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability
- Most efforts spent on confidentiality historically
- Integrity and availability are more important in emerging and critical applications
- Examples: self-driving cars, drones, power grid, missile defense system
- Machine learning security:
  - Three undesired behaviors are still present, but many do not clearly categorize or recognize them.

# Golden Properties (of Secure Systems)

- Authentication
  - Proof that an entity is/owns/controls an identity

# Golden Properties (of Secure Systems)

- Authorization
  - Ensure that an entity has the necessary privilege to take the requested action
  - Least privilege: grants users and processes only the permissions necessary for their tasks, minimizing the risk of unauthorized access.

# Golden Properties (of Secure Systems)

- **Accountability/auditability**
  - Ability to link (past) actions to the entity that executed them
  - You should have a clear view of who is responsible for a given behavior
  - Having good visibility into your system and its behavior is as important as building a secure system

# Defining “Secure” Systems

- System designers must choose what subset of these goals are important to their system
- Secure systems need *not* ensure *all* security goals are achieved
  - Can have significantly high cost, impossible to achieve



# Defining “Secure” systems

- Security Control
  - Method by which security goals are achieved, e.g., encryption
  - Essentially the opposite of an “Attack”
- Security Mechanism
  - Implementation of a security mechanism, e.g., AES, RSA

# Defining “Secure” systems

- Security mechanisms have a **cost**
  - Processing time, storage space, programmer time, code complexity, pushback in the real world, etc.
  - This why you do not always try to defend against EVERYTHING
  - **Spend your (limited) security resources wisely**

# Attacks

- An **attack** undermines one or more security goals
  - An **adversary** is an entity that is implementing and/or launching attacks
  - A **vulnerability** can be exploited by an adversary to launch attacks

# Attacks

- Attacks result generally from:
  - Mismatches in “mental models” and “actualized models” of systems
  - Unfounded assumptions: legit users only
  - Unenforced assumptions: user should use complex passwords
  - Misplaced trust: trust in third-party software without validation (SolarWinds Orion Hack)
  - Feature Creep: gradually add features that are not secure

# Know Your Adversary

- Different adversaries have different capabilities
  - A script-kiddie can ...
  - A nation state can ...
- Define **who** your adversary is, build mechanisms against them
- **Threat Model:** clearly defines adversary knowledge, adversary capability

# Know Your Adversary

- Some adversaries are more likely than others...
  - Odds a random script-kiddie wants my password?
  - Odds the NSA wants my password?
- The stronger the adversary, often the more costly the security mechanisms become
  - Again, spend your security resources wisely!

# Why Do Attackers Do This?

- A lot of reasons...
  - To make money
  - To cost you money
  - To make money by costing you money
  - Because they are a terrorist
  - Because they are a freedom fighter
  - Because they are a government, and you are a different one
  - Because they are at war with you
  - Because it is cool
  - Because they are mad
  - Because they can

# Building An Attack

- Adversaries (generally) approach this process by keeping in mind
  - Their end goal
  - What unfounded/unenforced assumptions, mistakes, bugs they have found
- Each assumption by itself might not **directly** lead to undermining a security property
  - But one bug might lead to the ability to create another....
    - SQL injection -> browse database to find other vulner.
- The challenge for an attacker is to find these little flaws, and chain them together into something bigger....



// Checks if there is enough money in the account to handle the charge, and if so, executes the charge

```
public boolean chargeAccount(double debitAmount) {  
    if (this.balance >= debitAmount) {  
        this.balance -= debitAmount;  
        return true;  
    } else {  
        return false;  
    }  
}
```

What is the assumption?

What can an adversary do with it?

// Checks if there is enough money in the account to handle the charge, and if so, executes the charge

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public boolean chargeAccount(double debitAmount) {  
    if (this.balance >= debitAmount) {  
        this.balance -= debitAmount;  
        return true;  
    } else {  
        return false;  
    }  
}
```

*myself.chargeAccount(-100.00);*

What else?

```
// Fetch information for a single client
public Object executeClientLookup(String name) {
    // Build the SQL query to fetch client information based on the client's name
    String sql = "SELECT * FROM client WHERE name = '" + name + "'";

    // Execute the SQL query using the sqlEngine and return the result
    return this.sqlEngine.execute(sql);
}
```

What is the assumption?

What can an adversary do with it?

‘name’ is directly inserted into query string,  
attacker can inject arbitrary SQL code

```
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```

```
executeClientLookup("Bob' OR 1 = 1 --");
```

```
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    // Execute the SQL query using the sqlEngine and return the result
    return this.sqlEngine.execute(sql);
}
```

```
executeClientLookup("Bob"; drop table client --");
```

```
// Directory where we keep our HTML files
public final String WEBPAGE_ROOT_DIRECTORY = "/home/webhome/";

// Gets requested page from HTTP request... calls fetchWebpageFile
public byte[] fetchWebpageFile(String webPage) {
    // Build the path to the HTML document
    String fullPath = WEBPAGE_ROOT_DIRECTORY + webPage;

    // Read and return
    InputStream fln = new FileInputStream(fullPath);
    // ...
}
```

What is the assumption?

What can an adversary do with it?


# Directory Traversal Attacks: no sanity check on paths

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```

*<http://vulnerable.org/nothing/tosee/here/../../../../etc/shadow>*






# Using A Few Assumptions Put Together

- A protocol exists called ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) echo
  - Sender sends a hello message
  - Receiving party sends back a reply message
- There is no integrity on the “from” IP address in a network packet
- Networks have a broadcast address
  - Send a message to that address, it gets broadcast to every device on the network

# Smurf Attack



# Heartbleed



- TLS is the de facto protocol for secure online communication
- Heartbleed was a vulnerability in the most popular TLS server
  - A malformed packet allows you to see server memory
- Fix: don't let the user just tell you how much data to give back
- This was a design flaw

SERVER, ARE YOU STILL THERE?  
IF SO, REPLY "POTATO" (6 LETTERS).



...s pages about "boards", user Alice requests  
secure connection using key "4538538374224"  
User Meg wants these 6 letters: POTATO. User  
da wants pages about "irl games". Unlocking  
secure records with master key 5130985733435  
...is (oh my user) sends this message: "H



...s pages about "boards", user Alice requests  
secure connection using key "4538538374224"  
User Meg wants these 6 letters: **POTATO**. User  
da wants pages about "irl games". Unlocking  
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POTATO



SERVER, ARE YOU STILL THERE?  
IF SO, REPLY "BIRD" (4 LETTERS).



User Olivia from London wants pages about "na  
bees in car why". Note: Files for IP 375.381.  
283.17 are in /tmp/files-3843. User Meg wants  
these 4 letters: BIRD. There are currently 348  
connections open. User Brendan uploaded the file  
selfie.jpg (contents: 834ba962e20cb9ff89b43bffb9)



HMM...



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BIRD



SERVER, ARE YOU STILL THERE?  
IF SO, REPLY "HAT" (500 LETTERS).




...connection. Jake requested pictures of deer.  
User Meg wants these 500 letters: **HAT**. Lucas requests the "missed connections" page. Eve (administrator) wants to set server's master key to "14835038534". Isabel wants pages about snakes but not too long". User Karen wants to change account password to "Coff-BaGt". User



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- User passwords, private keys, personal information...  
~40% of "secure" web servers vulnerable